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The concept of convex optimal control problems may be of interest in model predictive control when a sequence of open-loop optimal control problems is solved to obtain feedback. Stability of the closedloop crucially depends on the fact that global optima for the involved open-loop problems are found. The latter is clearly facilitated if the involved problems are convex. It seems also plausible that one can use the theoretical results and algorithms presented in this note for some optimal control processes governed by partial differential equations.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a finite horizon noncooperative game [2] where the stage cost of the ith player associated with a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the game. In Section III, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria and of at least one Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. We do this by recasting the game within the framework of potential games [15] that always admit at least one Nash equilibrium, although its computation is a nontrivial issue [7] , [10] , [17] , [18] . In Sections IV and V, we show that stronger results are obtained if the horizon reduces to a single stage. We find all Nash equilibria, and in particular, a Pareto optimal one that is social optimal in the set of all Nash equilibria, as it minimizes the sum of the players' costs. We also define a consensus protocol [3] , [12] - [14] that makes the players converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. We do this in agreement with a large body of literature on evolutionary game theory and fictitious play (see e.g., the book [5] and [16] ) that centers around the convergence to refined Nash equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria that meet special properties. Social and Pareto optimality are just properties characterizing the Nash equilibria to which the dynamics induced by the consensus protocols converges. In Section VI, we come back to the multistage game and we modify the aforementioned protocol to derive a so-called best response path algorithm that makes the players converge to a Nash equilibrium. This algorithm is based on the property of potential games establishing that any best response path converges to a Nash equilibrium [15] , [16] . A best response path is a sequence of joint decisions, each one obtained from the previous one by an unilateral improvement on the part of a single player. In Section VII, we specialize the game to a multiinventory application [1] , [6] , [8] , [9] , [11] .
II. NONCOOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME
We deal with a discrete-time finite horizon noncooperative game that presents all the ingredients typical of an inventory application. However, we deal with the game in its general form in order to emphasize what characteristics make the results of this paper hold.
Consider a set of n players Γ = {1, . . . , n} and let N be the horizon length. 
where (1) is the cost function, obtained as sum over the horizon of a stage cost (2) is the state dynamics with Ξ(., .) being a generic nonlinear function, possibly time variant and player specific, but such that 
III. NASH AND PARETO OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria and characterize the Pareto optimal ones. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria by exploiting the well-known result in [15] asserting that a noncooperative game always admits a pure Nash equilibrium if a potential function exists. A potential function is a function
] is a solution obtained from a unilateral deviation from u on the part of a generic player i (hence
) is equal to, or at least proportional to, the difference in the cost for player i, that is, 
where the third equality (from line 2 to 3) is a direct consequence of
The latter equality is true as, for all k = 1, . . . , N , the following conditions hold:
Condition (4) To prove that condition (5) holds, observe that it must hold a(û k ) = a(u k ) ± 1. Actually, if only player i may change decision, then the number of active players either reduces by 1 (player i changes from being active to being nonactive) or increases by 1 (player i changes from being nonactive to being active). Consider, for instance, the latter case;
We can conclude that right-hand side (RHS) and left-hand side (LHS) of (5) are equal. Symmetrical argument applies to the case where player i changes from being active to being not active. In this situation, both sides of (5) are equal to −ψ(a(u k )). As a consequence, by the results in [15] , we can state the following corollary. (1)- (2), we can define
Then,
In solving (6)- (7), we can do as if a k * was independent of u k i . Actually, we can substitute
We can do such a substitution as it turns out that
To see why the latter equality holds true, observe that the stage cost
k . It follows that the best response for player i must be a solution of (7), i.e.,
where we defineã 
In the following, in case of multiple solutions, we choose u k * i as the lowest among the possible scalar values that satisfy (8) . In this way, we guarantee the uniqueness of the best response and we can describe the equilibria indifferently in terms of either u * or a 0 given their bijective correspondence. Needless to say, the players can choose any other criterium that guarantees the uniqueness of the best response in (8) Theorem 2: At least, a Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Proof: As the Nash equilibria are finite in number, there must necessarily exist a Nash equilibrium that is not dominated.
IV. SINGLE-STAGE GAME
We now consider a finite horizon noncooperative game consisting in a single-stage game with payoffs (in all the equations of this section, we drop the dependence on k)
where all the variables and functions have the same definitions and properties of the original game. Game (9) is trivially obtained from the original game by imposing N = 0. For each i ∈ Γ, let l : Z → N, increasing function of x i , be given. Henceforth, we simply use the notation l i to mean l(x i ), i.e., the value of the function for fixed x i . Note that in the single-stage game and once the scenario is fixed (x i fixed), x i becomes a known parameter (the initial inventory), and therefore, we can omit dependence of l(x i ) on x i .
Definition 1: A threshold strategy is any functionũ(.) : N × N −→ R such thatũ(a, l i ) assumes a positive value if a ≥ l i and is null otherwise. In this case, l i is said threshold.
The aforementioned threshold strategy says that player i is active only if the number of active players a is greater than or equal to threshold l i . Let us now characterize a Nash equilibrium, u 
Proof: Let us first prove that the best response u * i of player i is a threshold strategy. For this purpose, for each player i, and for any number of active players β ≥ α, let ζ α and ζ β be the best responses for a * = α and a * = β, respectively [they solve (10) with a * = α and a * = β]. We show that if ζ α > 0 [it means δ(ζ α ) = 1, the ith player is active], then ζ β > 0. To see this, observe that ζ α > 0 only if
As ψ(.) is a positive function, to have ζ β > 0, it suffices to prove that
Note that the RHS of the aforementioned two inequalities are equal as they do not depend on the number of active players. Then, we can show that the latter inequality holds as
where the first inequality is due to the optimality of ζ β and the second inequality is due to the monotonicity of ψ on the number of active players. Then, we have proved that u * i =ũ(a * , l i ). Now, to see that the threshold is as in (11), observe that it must also hold ψ(α)
But the latter conditions hold if and only if the value of l i is as in (11) .
As in (7), the best response u * i defined in the aforementioned lemma depends on other players' course of action u * −i only through a * . In the next theorem, we characterize the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. To this aim, let us relate Nash equilibria to subsets of players as follows. Without loss of generality, assume that the players are indexed increasingly on their thresholds, i.e., l 1 Proof: The solution u * describes the case where the active players are the only players in C, and therefore, the number of active players is λ. Then, no players i ∈ C benefit by unilaterally deciding on becoming nonactive as l i ≤λ and also no players j ∈ C benefit by deciding on becoming active as l j >λ + 1.
Theorem 3: Let u * be the Nash equilibrium associated to the maximal compatible set C, i.e.,
for all i ∈ C, then the following condition holds.
1) Pareto optimality: The Nash equilibrium u * is Pareto optimal. 2) Uniqueness: The Nash equilibrium u * is the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. 3) Social optimality: The Nash equilibrium u * is social optimal in the set of all Nash equilibria. Proof: Pareto optimality: We show that the Nash equilibrium u * = [u * 1 , . . . , u * n ] is Pareto optimal since any other vector of strategies u = [u 1 , . . . , u n ] induces a worse payoff for at least one player. In the Nash equilibrium u * , each i ∈ C gets a payoffĴ i (
for all u i > 0. Now, consider the vector of strategies u. Define D = {i ∈ C : δ(u i ) = 0} as the set of players with l i ≤λ that are not active in u and E = {i ∈ C : δ(u i ) = 1} as the set of players with l i >λ + 1 that are active in u. Let us denote by ν and η the cardinality of D and E, respectively. Trivially, D ∪ E = ∅ as u = u * . We deal with E = ∅ and E = ∅ separately. If E = ∅ and D = ∅, each player i ∈ E gets a pay- 0) as C is the maximal compatible set. The latter condition trivially holds also when D = ∅ since in this case, each player i ∈ E incurs in a higher payoffĴ i (x i , u i ,
Uniqueness and social optimality:
We prove the uniqueness and the social optimality of the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium by showing that it dominates all the other equilibria. Consider a generic Nash equilibrium u associated with a compatible set C, say λ its cardinal-
Then, in any generic Nash equilibrium, each player has a payoff not better than the one associated with u * . Observe that if and only if ψ(λ) + γ(x i , u * i ) = γ(x i , 0) for all i, there exist two Pareto optimal Nash equilibria with equal payoff. They are associated, respectively, with the maximal compatible set C and to the empty set. Henceforth, we will call Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium only the equilibrium u * associated with the maximal compatible set C. Also, observe that there is no other Nash equilibrium with a higher number of active players than the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Let us finally note that the minimizer of the sum of players' costs, say it social optimum, is, in general, not an equilibrium. However, if we restrict the minimization within the set of Nash equilibria, then the social optimum is on the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium as it has been shown in the aforementioned theorem. Restricting the minimization within the set of Nash equilibria makes sense as the players participate to a noncooperative game; then any solution that is not an equilibrium is of no interest.
V. CONSENSUS PROBLEM
With focus on the single-stage game (9), we now introduce a protocol that makes the players strategies converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium characterized in Theorem 3.
For all players i ∈ Γ, let us refer toâ i as their estimate of a in the assumption that each player may exchange information only with a subset of neighbor players. In this sense, the set Γ induces an undirected connected graph G = (Γ, E) whose edgeset E includes all non oriented couples (i, j) of players that exchange information with each other. Also, define the neighborhood of player i the set N i = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {i}. Let z i (τ ) ∈ R be a continuous time variable describing the transmitted information for τ ≥ 0 and let T be a sufficiently large time interval. The information flow is managed
where f i : R n → R describes the dynamics of the transmitted information of the ith node as a function of the information both available at the node itself and transmitted by the other nodes, as in (13); φ i : R → R estimates, based on current information, the aggregate info, as in (14) .
The protocol receives as input x i and z j for all j ∈ N i and must be initialized at a predefined value z i (0). The value of x i is used in (15) to compute l i according to (11) . The protocol uses the estimateâ i,ss to return as output the best response u * i as in (15) , whereâ i,ss represents the steady-state value assumed byâ i (τ ), namelŷ
In the rest of this section, we present a distributed protocol Π = {(f i , φ i ) : for all i ∈ Γ} proposed by the authors in [4] , such that the steady-state estimate coincides with the current number of active players and withλ, i.e.,â i,ss = a = i ∈Γ δ(u i ) =λ. Actually, the latter condition is sufficient for the convergence to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of Theorem 3.
Assume that the transmitted information z i (τ ) is the current estimate of the percentage of active players. For instance, z i (τ ) = 0.2 means that the ith player estimates only 20% of active players. Then, given the percentage of active players z i (τ ), the estimate of the number of active players is simplŷ
The protocol starts by assuming that all the players are active. This corresponds to initialize the transmitted states z i (0) = 1 or which is the same the estimatesâ i (0) = n for all i ∈ Γ.
Then, each player averages its estimate online on the basis of neighbors' estimates. If we denote by z(τ ) = {z i (τ )} i ∈Γ , the averaging process can be described by
where L i • is the ith row of the Laplacian matrix (see, e.g., [12] and [16] for details), and ∆(t − t i ) is an impulse signal due to which z i (t − i ) switches to a lower value z i (t + i ). Such a switch has the meaning of a correction term acting at any time t i where the estimateâ i (t i ) crosses from above the threshold l i , and consequently, the ith player is no longer willing to be active. Impulses may be activated only after the transient evolution ofż i (τ ) has expired. We assume that this occurs after t f time units, where t f is an estimate of the worst case possible settling time of the protocol dynamics. A standard result in graph theory is that the settling time decreases as the number of edges in the network increases. Actually, the speed of convergence depends on the second smallest in magnitude eigenvalue of the Laplacian (known as Fiedler eigenvalue) in the sense that the higher (in magnitude) the Fiedler eigenvalue, the faster the convergence [13] . In the light of the aforementioned consideration, t i is the first sampled time rt f , with r = 0, 1, . . . , where function δ(ũ(â i (rt f ), l i )) reaches zero, namely
Note that there may exist players characterized by l i > n, for which t i = 0, and players that never satisfy condition (18) , for which t i = T . Observe that, as players are indexed by increasing thresholds, it must also hold T ≥ t 1 ≥ t 2 ≥ · · · ≥ t n ≥ t n + 1 = 0. Furthermore, note that the evolution of the sampled values z(rt f ) for r = 0, 1, . . . is monotonically decreasing which implies that the impulse may be activated only one time for each player (once you exit the group, you are no longer allowed to rejoin it).
Theorem 4:
Proof: With in mind the values t i as in (17), let us set t n + 1 = 0, t 0 = T and consider the sequence of increasing discrete times t n + 1 , t n , . . . , t j + 1 , t j , . . . , t 0 . Also denote recursively by M (t j ) = {i ∈ A(t j ) :
and A(t n + 1 ) = Γ. Roughly speaking, A(t j ) is the set of players that are willing to be active at time t j whereas M (t j ) is the set of players that are no longer willing to be active from time t j onwards. Then, the evolution ofâ i (τ ) follows the discrete-time dynamicŝ
The aforementioned dynamics is monotonic decreasing and converges at the first time t j where A(t j ) is a compatible set. To see this, note that if A(t j ) is compatible then M (t j ) = ∅, and therefore,
The aforementioned equation implies that t j −1 = t j −2 = · · · = T , which means that condition (18) is never met for player j − 1, it exists, and for all its predecessors, if any. In the extreme case, we may have A(t j ) = · · · = A(t 1 ) = ∅ which means t j < T for all j ∈ Γ and also that condition (18) is met for all players j ∈ Γ. We have then proved that the aforementioned dynamics converges when A(t j ) is compatible. It is left to show that the compatible set A(t j ) is the maximal one, namely, A(t j ) = C. We show this by proving that if
such that l i ≤ |C| ≤ |A(t k )| but the latter fact is not possible from the definition of M (t k ). We conclude the proof by observing that
M (t k ) = ∅, and consequently,
VI. BEST RESPONSE PATH ALGORITHM
We have shown that the game (1)- (2) is a potential game as it always admits a potential function (see Theorem 1) . Potential games have the strong property that any best response path converges to a Nash equilibrium. By the best response path, we intend a sequence of joint decisions u(0) → u(1) → · · · where u(j) = {u 1 (j) . . . u n (j)} and u i (j) is the vector of decisions (over the horizon) of player i at iteration j. Define a function σ : N → Γ, which returns a player for each iteration j of the sequence, i.e., σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 5, . . . means that at iteration 1, only player 2 updates its decision, whereas at iteration 2, only player 5 updates its decision. By updating a decision, we simply mean replacing the current decision by the best response. It may happen that the current decision is already the best response, and then, the updated decision coincides with the current decision. Now, each joint decision u(j + 1) is obtained from u(j) by an unilateral improvement on the part of player i = σ(j), i. More precisely, at iteration j, let the current decision be u(j) = {u 1 (j), . . . , u n (j)} with u i (j) = {u 
is such thatâ
) is the number of active players at stage k given the decision vector u k (j). Repeating the same argument for k = 0, . . . , N (we can run the protocol in parallel), the ith player can estimate the number of active players over the horizon a 0 (j) associated to the current decision u(j), namely, a
In the light of the aforementioned comments, we later show that the pseudo code of an algorithm, for a given function σ(.), returns a best response path, and consequently, converges to a Nash equilibrium. Let u i (j) be the solution (decisions of player i) at iteration j, then j = 0; WHILE not converging {i = σ(j), compute a 0 (j) from (19)- (20) using current u(j)
The algorithm eventually converges to a Nash equilibrium that depends on the chosen function σ(.). However, the choice of any generic function σ(.) does not compromise the convergence of the algorithm. The number of iterations is at most 2 n N . Actually, the best response for player i does not depend on the value of u −i , but only on the number of active players. Also, the algorithm can be stopped if no players have changed their decisions in the last n iterations. In the next section, we use the aforementioned algorithm in a multiinventory application. .
Here, ψ(a k (u k )) is monotone since the active retailers may share the same truck for their supplies, and so, the more they are, the less each of them pays for the transportation.
Example 1: Consider three retailers and parameters K = 24, p = 8, h = 1, c = 2. Retailers face a deterministic demand over the horizon of ten stages (see Table I ). The initial state is x 0 = [0 0 0]. Let us run the algorithm of the previous section in order to obtain a best response path. The retailers, at the first iteration, do not consider the possibility of sharing the transportation cost. No communication occurs among the retailers and they replenish in a fully uncoordinated fashion as displayed in Fig. 1 (left column) . The absence of coordination is evident as retailer 1 replenishes on days 0, 2, 5, and 8 (top left), retailer 2 on days 3 and 6 (middle left), and retailer 3 on days 1 and 7 (bottom left). At a second iteration, the third retailer [σ(2) = 3] estimates the number of active players over the horizon by running the protocol (19)- (20) and finds its best response by solving (8) . The same argument is repeated at the successive iterations letting the retailers unilaterally improve their payoffs one after the other. The algorithm converges in six iterations. The supply decisions at Nash equilibrium are displayed in Fig. 1 (right column) . Here, you can notice that retailers 1 and 3 replenish on day 1, retailers 1, 2, and 3 replenish on days 3 and 7, and retailers 1 and 2 on day 5.
